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Scientists studying consciousness are attempting to identify correlations between
measurements of consciousness and the physical world. Consciousness can only be
measured through first-person reports, which raises problems about the accuracy of
first-person reports, the possibility of non-reportable consciousness and the causal
closure of the physical world. Many of these issues could be resolved by assuming
that consciousness is entirely physical or functional. However, this would sacrifice the
theory-neutrality that is a key attraction of a correlates-based approach to the study
of consciousness. This paper puts forward a different solution that uses a framework
of definitions and assumptions to explain how consciousness can be measured. This
addresses the problems associated with first-person reports and avoids the issues with
the causal closure of the physical world. This framework is compatible with most of the
current theories of consciousness and it leads to a distinction between two types of
correlates of consciousness.
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INTRODUCTION
Consciousness just is not the sort of thing that can be measured
directly. What, then, do we do without a consciousness meter?
How can the search go forward? How does all this experimental
research proceed?
I think the answer is this: we get there with principles of inter-
pretation, by which we interpret physical systems to judge the
presence of consciousness. We might call these preexperimental
bridging principles. They are the criteria that we bring to bear in
looking at systems to say (1) whether or not they are conscious
now, and (2) which information they are conscious of, and which
they are not.
Chalmers (1998), p. 220
A science that invokes mental phenomena in its explanations
is presumptively committed to their causal efficacy; for any phe-
nomenon to have an explanatory role, its presence or absence in a
given situation must make a difference – a causal difference.
Kim (1998), p. 31
Consciousness is a significant research topic in philosophy
and elaborate thought experiments have been developed about
the relationship between consciousness and the physical world.
However, there is little agreement about the nature of con-
sciousness and it can be argued that our theories have failed
to advance much beyond Descartes. To address this impasse it
has been proposed that we should use scientific experiments
to identify correlations between consciousness and the physi-
cal world while suspending judgment about which metaphysi-
cal theory of consciousness (if any) is correct (Hohwy, 2007).
When we have more detailed information about the relationship
between consciousness and the physical world it might be pos-
sible to develop mathematical descriptions of this relationship
that could be experimentally tested. More data about the corre-
lates of consciousness could also help us to address philosophical
questions about consciousness.
In an experiment on the correlates of consciousness we mea-
sure the state of the physical world, measure consciousness1 ,
and look for spatiotemporal structures in the physical world
that only occur whenever a particular conscious state is present.
Consciousness can only bemeasured through first person reports,
which raises questions about their accuracy, the potentially large
variability in people’s consciousness, and the possibility that there
could be non-reportable consciousness. First-person reports also
have physical effects, such as movement of body parts or vibra-
tions in the air. Since consciousness is the putative cause of
these reports, it presumably has to be the sort of “thing” that
can bring about changes in the physical world. While this does
not present a problem for reductionist theories of consciousness,
such as functionalism (Kim, 1998), reports from a non-physical
consciousness would undermine the causal closure of the phys-
ical world. We are apparently forced to make functionalism or
physicalism our working assumption if we want to measure
consciousness. This would be disputed by many people and
it sacrifices the theory neutrality that is a key attraction of a
correlates-based approach to consciousness. A number of solu-
tions have been put forward to this problem, including dynamical
1This paper will not consider whether the measurement of consciousness
should involve the assignment of numbers to different aspects of it. The
conception of measurement in this paper is more similar to the use of a
level of abstraction to extract data sets that can have a wide range of types
(Floridi, 2008), than to the use of numerical measurement scales, such as those
discussed by Krantz et al. (2006).
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systems approaches (Van de Laar, 2006), causal overdetermina-
tion (Bennett, 2003; Kroedel, 2008), and intralevel causation
(Buckareff, 2011). However, the issue remains extremely con-
troversial, and each proposed solution is subject to its own
difficulties and limitations.
This article suggests how this problem could be addressed
by framing the scientific study of consciousness within a set of
assumptions that explain how we can measure consciousness
without getting entangled in debates about first-person reporting
and the causal relationship between consciousness and the phys-
ical world. This approach is compatible with most of the current
theories of consciousness and it is similar in intent to Chalmers’
(1998) pre-experimental bridging principles, although it differs
considerably in the details.
The framework of assumptions that is presented in this paper
is designed to insulate the scientific study of consciousness from
philosophical problems, such as zombies, color inversion and
the causal relationship between consciousness and the physical
world. Most scientific research on consciousness does not directly
engage with these problems, but they are valid concerns that could
potentially jeopardize experimental results. It is unlikely that these
problems can be easily solved, but it is possible to make a reason-
able set of assumptions that explicitly set them aside. The results
from the science of consciousness can then be considered to be
true given these assumptions. For example, scientists cannot prove
that their subjects are reporting all of their consciousness, but they
can assume that unreportable consciousness is not present during
experiments on the correlates of consciousness (assumption A4—
see section Platinum Standard Systems). While this framework
has important benefits for the scientific study of consciousness,
it also constrains the theories of consciousness that can be put
forward. For example, these assumptions are incompatible with
Zeki and Bartels’ (1999) proposal that micro-consciousnesses
are distributed through the brain and they suggest that all cor-
relates of consciousness have to be connected to first-person
reports.
The first part of this paper gives an overview of the scien-
tific study of consciousness and sets out a number of working
assumptions about the relationship between consciousness and
the normally functioning adult human brain. The next part puts
forward an interpretation of the measurement of consciousness
that does not rely on a premature commitment to functionalism
or physicalism and which does not break the causal closure of the
physical world. This has implications for experimental work on
the correlates of consciousness and it leads to a division of pro-
posed correlates of consciousness into two distinct types. Some
implications of this approach for the science of consciousness
are discussed in the last part and the complete set of defini-
tions, lemmas, and assumptions is provided as an appendix to
this paper.
THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
This section gives an overview of experiments on the corre-
lates of consciousness, whichmeasure consciousness, measure the
physical world and look for spatiotemporal structures that are
correlated with conscious states. A number of assumptions are
needed to handle the fact that a brain’s consciousness can only
be measured indirectly through first person reports, which can
also be generated by systems that are not typically thought to be
conscious, such as computers. It is also necessary to assume that
consciousness cannot vary independently of our measurement of
it, which would undermine our ability to study consciousness
scientifically.
MEASUREMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS (C-REPORTS)
A full discussion of the best way to define consciousness is beyond
the scope of this article. The working definition that I will use is
that consciousness is the stream of experience that appears when
we wake up in the morning and disappears when we fall into deep
sleep at night. This can have different levels of intensity (from
drowsy to hyper alert) and a wide variety of contents. We can-
not directly detect the consciousness of another person, and so
a variety of external behaviors are used to infer the presence of
conscious states.
When I say “I am conscious” I am stating that I can see objects
distributed in space around me, that I can hear, smell and touch
these objects and attend to different aspects of them. A report of a
conscious experience can be spoken, written down, or expressed
as a set of responses to yes/no questions—for example, when
patients communicate by imagining playing tennis or walking
around a house in an fMRI scanner (Monti et al., 2010)2. People
can be asked to subjectively assess the clarity of their visual experi-
ence (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004), and their level of awareness
of a stimulus can be extracted using indirect measures, such as
post-decision wagering (Persaud et al., 2007)3.
When people are not explicitly reporting their consciousness
they can still be considered to be conscious on the basis of their
external behavior. For example, Shanahan (2010) has argued
that enhanced flexibility in the face of novelty and the ability
to inwardly execute a sequence of problem-solving steps are a
sign of consciousness, and the Glasgow Coma Scale uses motor
responsiveness, verbal performance and eye opening to measure
the level of consciousness in patients (Teasdale and Jennett, 1974).
An overview of some of the different techniques for measuring
consciousness is given by Seth et al. (2008).
I will use “c-report” to designate any form of external behav-
ior that is interpreted as a report about the level and/or contents
of consciousness. This paper will primarily focus on verbal c-
reporting, on the assumption that similar arguments can be
applied to any form of behavioral report about consciousness.
C-reporting will be interpreted in the fullest possible sense, so
that every possible detail of a conscious experience that could be
reported will be assumed to be reported.
One of the key problems with c-reporting is that it is hard
to obtain accurate detailed descriptions of conscious states.
Consciousness changes several times per second and it is altered
by the act of c-reporting, so how can we describe it using
natural language, which operates on a time scale of seconds?
2It is assumed that a single stream of consciousness is being reported. Many of
the issues raised in this paper are also applicable to Dennett’s (1991) multiple
drafts model.
3See Sandberg et al. (2010) for a comparison of post-decision wagering, the
perceptual awareness scale and confidence ratings.
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Shanahan (2010) has suggested that this problem could be
addressed by resetting our consciousness, so that multiple probes
can be run on a single fixed state (see section Platinum Standard
Systems). People can also be trained to make more accurate
reports about their consciousness (Lutz et al., 2002), and there
has been a substantial amount of work on the use of interviews to
help people describe their conscious states4. These problems have
led to a debate about the extent to which we can generate accurate
descriptions of our consciousness (Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel,
2007).
C-reports are typically transformed into natural language
descriptions of a state of consciousness. However, natural lan-
guage is not ideal for describing consciousness because it is
context-dependent, ambiguous and it cannot be used to describe
the experiences of non-human systems (Chrisley, 1995). It is also
difficult to see how natural language descriptions could be incor-
porated into mathematical theories of consciousness. One way
of addressing these problems would be to use a tightly struc-
tured formal language to describe consciousness (Gamez, 2006).
Chrisley (1995) hasmade some suggestions about how conscious-
ness can be described using robotic systems, although it is not
clear to what extent these proposals could be play a role in a
mathematical theory of consciousness.
MEASUREMENT OF UNCONSCIOUS INFORMATION (UC-REPORTS)
The absence of a c-report about the level and/or contents of con-
sciousness is typically taken as a sign that a person is unconscious
or that a particular piece of information in the brain is uncon-
scious. People can also make deliberate reports of unconscious
mental content. For example, forced choice guessing is used in
psychology experiments to measure unconscious mental content
and visually guided reaching behavior in blindsight patients is
interpreted as a sign that they have access to unconscious visual
information. Galvanic skin responses can indicate that informa-
tion is being processed unconsciously (Kotze and Moller, 1990)
and priming effects can be used to determine if words are being
processed unconsciously—for example, Merikle and Daneman
(1996) played words to patients under general anesthesia and
found that when they were awake they often completed word
stems with words that they had heard unconsciously.
All of these types of unconscious reporting will be referred
to as “uc-reports,” which are any form of positive or negative
behavioral output that is interpreted as the absence of conscious-
ness or the presence of unconscious information. While there will
inevitably be gray areas between c-reports and uc-reports, it will
be assumed that there are enough clear examples of both types to
justify the distinction in this paper.
4In the explication interview (EI) a trained person interviews a subject about
a conscious experience to help them provide an accurate report (Petitmengin,
2006). In descriptive event sampling (DES) the subject carries a beeper, which
goes off at random several times per day. When they hear the beep the subject
makes notes about their consciousness just before the beep. This is followed
by an interview that is designed to help the subject to provide faithful descrip-
tions of the sampled experiences (Hurlburt and Akhter, 2006). Froese et al.
(2011) discuss some of the first- and second-person methods for measuring
consciousness.
PLATINUM STANDARD SYSTEMS
To scientifically study consciousness we need to start with a physi-
cal system that is commonly agreed to be capable of consciousness
and whose c-reports can be believed to be about consciousness.
The typical approach that is taken in empirical work on con-
sciousness is to set aside philosophical worries about solipsism
and zombies, and make the assumption that the human brain
is capable of consciousness. This assumption can be made more
general by introducing the notion of a platinum standard system,
which is defined as follows 5 :
D1. A platinum standard system is a physical system that is
assumed to be associated with consciousness some or all of the
time.
By “associated” it is meant that consciousness is linked to a
platinum standard system, but no claims are being made about
causation or metaphysical identity. With this definition in place,
we can make the explicit assumption that the human brain is a
platinum standard system6 :
A1.The normally functioning adult human brain is a platinum
standard system.
By “normally functioning” it is meant that the brain is alive,
that it would be certified as normally functioning by a doctor,
and that it does not contain any unusual chemicals that might
affect its operation7. While the normally functioning adult human
brain is currently the only system that is confidently associ-
ated with consciousness, further assumptions could be added to
5I selected the term “platinum standard system” as a reference to the plat-
inum bar that was the first working definition of a meter. Other objects were
directly or indirectly compared to this platinum bar to measure their length,
but the length of the bar itself could not be checked because it was not mean-
ingful to compare it with itself. In a similar way, the normally functioning
adult human brain is a system that is our starting point for consciousness
science. In this system consciousness is simply assumed to be present. Once
we have established which spatiotemporal structures are correlated with con-
sciousness in this “platinum standard” system, we can use our knowledge
about these spatiotemporal structures to measure consciousness in other
systems.
6A number of people have questioned the assumption that consciousness
is correlated with brain states alone. For example, O’Regan and Noë claim:
“There can therefore be no one-to-one correspondence between visual expe-
rience and neural activations. Seeing is not constituted by activation of neural
representations. Exactly the same neural state can underlie different experi-
ences, just as the same body position can be part of different dances” (O’Regan
and Noë, 2001, p. 966). A less radical position can be found in Noë’s later
work: “A reasonable bet, at this point, is that some experience, or some fea-
tures of some experiences, are, as it were, exclusively neural in their causal
basis, but that full-blown, mature human experience is not” (Noë, 2004, p.
218). I have presented my own view on this issue elsewhere (Gamez, 2014).
The implications that it might have for the scientific study of consciousness
are discussed at the end of the paper.
7In previous work I have made the assumption that the awake normal
adult human brain is a platinum standard system (Gamez, 2011, 2012).
Assumptions A3 and A4 make the assumption that the brain is awake
unnecessary—in the absence of c-reports, the brain is assumed to be uncon-
scious.
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extend the number of platinum standard systems—for example,
claiming that infant, monkey or alien brains are associated with
consciousness.
A second issue in consciousness research is the possibility that
two platinum standard systems in similar states could be asso-
ciated with radically different consciousnesses while manifesting
the same behavior. For example, there is the classic problem of
color inversion, according to which I might experience red when
my brain is in a particular state, you might experience green,
and we could both use “blue” to describe our conscious states.
More complicated situations can be imagined—for instance, my
consciousness of having a bath could be remapped onto a behav-
ioral output that controls an airplane. If consciousness can vary
independently of the physical world, then it will be impossible to
systematically study the relationship between consciousness and
the physical world.
A simple way of addressing this issue is to assume that con-
sciousness supervenes on the physical world. Since we are only
concerned with developing a pragmatic approach to the science
of consciousness, it is not necessary to assume that consciousness
logically or metaphysically supervenes on the brain—we just need
to assume that the natural laws are such that consciousness cannot
vary independently of the physical world:
A2. The consciousness associated with a platinum standard
system nomologically supervenes on the platinum standard
system. In our current universe physically identical platinum
standard systems are associated with identical consciousness.
The c-reports that are used to measure consciousness can be
cross-checked against each other for consistency, but there is no
ultimate way of establishing whether a set of c-reports from a
platinum standard system correspond to the consciousness that
is associated with the platinum standard system. Since c-reports
are the only way in which consciousness can be scientifically
measured, it has to be explicitly assumed that c-reports from a
platinum standard system co-vary with its consciousness:
A3. During an experiment on the correlates of consciousness,
the consciousness associated with a platinum standard system
is functionally connected to its c-reports about consciousness.
A3 captures the idea that when we make a c-report about con-
sciousness, what we say about consciousness has some corre-
spondence with the consciousness that is being c-reported. The
functional connectivity means that the link between conscious-
ness and c-reports is a deviation from statistical independence,
not a causal connection8 . A3 does not specify the amount of
8Functional connectivity (a deviation from statistical independence between
A and B) is typically contrasted with structural connectivity (a physical link
between A and B) and from effective connectivity (a causal link from A to
B). A number of algorithms exist for measuring functional connectivity (for
example, mutual information) and it can be measured with a delay. These
algorithms cannot be used to measure the functional connectivity between
consciousness and the c-reports because consciousness cannot be directly
measured.
functional connectivity between consciousness and the c-reports,
which might be quite low because of the limits of the c-reporting
methods. A3 is also explicitly restricted to experimental work,
which leaves open the possibility that predictions could be made
about consciousness in situations in which c-reporting is discon-
nected from consciousness.
A contrastive experiment that compares the states of the
conscious and unconscious brain is meaningless if the appar-
ently unconscious brain is actually conscious but unable to
report or remember its consciousness. Similarly, a binocular
rivalry experiment on consciousness is worthless if the appar-
ently unconscious information is associated with a separate
consciousness that is disconnected from the memory and/or
reporting systems. Ghostly ecosystems of unreportable conscious-
nesses would completely undermine all contrastive experiments
on consciousness—scientific studies can only proceed on the
assumption that they do not exist:
A4. During an experiment on the correlates of consciousness
all conscious states associated with a platinum standard system
are available for c-reports about consciousness.
A4 assumes that all conscious states in a platinum standard system
are available for c-report, even if they are not actually reported
during an experiment9. This makes it possible to use a variety of
c-reports to extract a complete picture of the consciousness asso-
ciated with a particular state of a platinum standard system. To
circumvent the problems of limited working memory it might be
necessary to put the system into a particular state, run the probe,
reset the system and apply a different probe, until all of the data
about consciousness has been extracted10.
Assumption A4 is explicitly limited to experiments on the cor-
relates of consciousness. During these experiments it is assumed
that the consciousness that is present in the system can be
measured, which is a condition of possibility for this type
of experimental work. While phenomenal consciousness and
access “consciousness” might be conceptually dissociable (Block,
1995)11, the idea that non-measureable phenomenal conscious-
ness could be present during experiments on the correlates of
consciousness is, from the perspective of this paper, incompati-
ble with the scientific study of the correlates of consciousness. A4
is also incompatible with panpsychism, which claims that appar-
ently unconscious parts of the brain and body are associated with
an inaccessible consciousness. For similar reasons A4 is likely to be
incompatible with Zeki and Bartels’ (1999) proposal that micro-
consciousnesses are distributed throughout the brain. Outside of
experiments on the correlates of consciousness it is possible, even
likely, that there could be inaccessible phenomenal consciousness.
Information gathered by experiments on the correlates of con-
sciousness could be used to make predictions about the presence
9This is expressed by Block (2007) as the idea of cognitive accessibility.
10Shanahan (2010) suggests how an omnipotent psychologist could extract
data about consciousness in this way.
11I have argued elsewhere (Gamez, 2008) that Block’s (1995) notion of
“access consciousness” is better described as unconscious or non-conscious
representational states, rather than as a form of consciousness.
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of phenomenal consciousness in these situations—for example, it
could be used to make predictions about consciousness in brain
damaged patients, infants or animals.
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PHYSICAL
WORLD
In this paper, the correlates of consciousness are defined in a sim-
ilar way to Chalmers’ (2000) definition of the total correlates of
consciousness12 :
D2. A correlate of a conscious experience, e1, is a minimal
set of one or more spatiotemporal structures in the physical
world. This set is present when e1 is present and absent when
e1 is absent.
The notion of a minimal set is intended to exclude features
of a platinum standard system that typically occur at the same
time as consciousness, but whose removal would not lead to
the alteration or loss of consciousness. For example, the cor-
relates of consciousness in the brain might have prerequisites
and consequences (see section Separating out the Correlates of
Consciousness) that would typically co-occur with conscious-
ness, but the brain would be conscious in exactly the same way
if the minimal set of correlates could be induced without these
prerequisites and consequences. Correlates defined according to
D2 would continue to be associated with consciousness if they
were extracted from the brain or implemented in an artificial sys-
tem. I have excluded terms like “necessity” and “sufficiency” from
D2 because they could imply that the physical brain causes con-
sciousness, which is not required for a strictly correlations-based
approach13. “Spatiotemporal structures” is a deliberately vague
term that captures anything that might be correlated with con-
sciousness, such as activity in brain areas, neural synchronization,
electromagnetic waves, quantum events, etc. The minimal set of
spatiotemporal structures can be established by systematic exper-
iments in which all possible combinations of candidate features
are considered (see Table 1). An experiment on the correlates of
consciousness is illustrated in Figure 1.
While there has been an extensive amount of work on the neu-
ral correlates of consciousness, it has not been demonstrated that
consciousness is only correlated with activity in biological neu-
rons. It is possible that spatiotemporal structures in other com-
ponents of the brain, such as hemoglobin or glia, are correlated
with consciousness as well. To fully understand the relation-
ship between consciousness and the physical world we need to
12Chalmers (2000) distinguishes the total neural basis from the core neural
basis: “A total NCC builds in everything and thus automatically suffices for
the corresponding conscious states. A core NCC, on the other hand, contains
only the ‘core’ processes that correlate with consciousness. The rest of the total
NCC will be relegated to some sort of background conditions required for the
correct functioning of the core” (Chalmers, 2000, p. 26). Block (2007) makes
a similar distinction.
13If you think that “necessary and sufficient” doesn’t imply causality, consider
reversing the sentence “Neural synchronization is necessary and sufficient
for consciousness.” Many people would consider “Consciousness is necessary
and sufficient for neural synchronization” to be incoherent or wrong, which
suggests that “necessary and sufficient” has causal overtones.
consider all possible spatiotemporal structures in a platinum stan-
dard system that might be correlated with consciousness (Gamez,
2012).
Definition D2 enables me to state assumption A2 more pre-
cisely:
A2a. The consciousness associated with a platinum standard
system nomologically supervenes on the correlates of con-
sciousness in the platinum standard system. In our current
universe the spatiotemporal structures that correlate with con-
scious experience e1 will be associated with e1wherever they are
found.
Finally, since the correlates of consciousness are not statistically
independent from a platinum standard system’s consciousness,
they can also be described as features of a platinum standard sys-
tem that are functionally connected to its conscious states. This
way of describing the relationship between consciousness and the
physical brain will play a role in what follows, and so it will be
formally stated as lemma 1:
L1. There is a functional connection between consciousness
and the correlates of consciousness.
Table 1 | Illustrative example of correlations that could exist between
conscious experiences (e1 and e2) and a physical system.
Spatiotemporal Conscious
structures experiences
A B C D e1 e2
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
It is assumed that e1 and e2 can occur at the same time. A–D are spatiotemporal
structures in a platinum standard system, such as dopamine, neural synchroniza-
tion or 40Hz electromagnetic waves. A–D are assumed to be the only possible
features of the system. “1” indicates that a feature is present; “0” indicates
that it is absent. In this example D is not a correlate of consciousness because it
does not systematically co-vary with either of the conscious states. {A,B} is a set
of spatiotemporal structures that correlates with conscious experience e1. {C} is
a set of spatiotemporal structures that correlates with conscious experience e2.
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FIGURE 1 | Experiment on the correlates of consciousness. The
normally functioning adult human brain is assumed to be a platinum
standard system that is associated with consciousness (D1 and A1).
All of this system’s conscious states are available for c-reports (A4),
which are functionally connected to its conscious states (A3).
Correlations are identified between the spatiotemporal structures in
the platinum standard system and the c-reports about
consciousness14.
CAUSATION AND REPORTS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS
The definitions, assumptions and lemmas that have been
presented so far put us in a good position for the scientific study
of consciousness. We have a set of systems that are capable of con-
sciousness and their consciousness cannot vary independently of
the physical world. C-reports can be used to measure conscious-
ness, and all of a system’s consciousness is available for c-report
during an experiment on the correlates of consciousness.
This part of the paper addresses the question of how the mea-
surement of consciousness relates to the causal closure of the
physical world. The section on empirical causation develops a
clearer understanding of physical causation, which is used to
relate the framework that has been developed so far to causal
relationships in the brain and world. This leads to a distinction
between two types of correlates of consciousness and it clari-
fies how the correlates of consciousness can be experimentally
separated out from other spatiotemporal structures in the brain.
EMPIRICAL CAUSATION (E-CAUSATION)
Causal concepts play an important role in the philosophy of
mind and claims are often made about the causal closure of the
physical world and the causal impotency of mental states. These
issues could be addressed more effectively if we had a clearer
understanding of the nature of causation, but this a contentious
topic and there is no generally agreed theory.
14These diagrams attempt to strike a balance between clarity and accuracy,
which has led to a number of compromises. The most serious is that the
brain is shown as pink, whereas in fact it is colorless (Metzinger, 2000).
The depiction of a bubble of consciousness floating above a brain is purely
A first step towards a better understanding of causation is
Dowe’s (2000) distinction between a conceptual analysis of cau-
sation that elucidates how we understand and use causal concepts
in our everyday speech, and an empirical account of causation,
which explains how causation operates in the physical world15.
Predominantly conceptual accounts of causation include Lewis’
(1973) counterfactual analysis and Mackie’s (1993) INUS con-
ditions. Empirical theories reduce causation to the exchange of
physically conserved quantities, such as energy and momentum
(Aronson, 1971a,b; Fair, 1979; Dowe, 2000), or link causation
with physical forces (Bigelow et al., 1988; Bigelow and Pargetter,
1990).
While conceptual analyses of causation remain popular within
philosophy, it is difficult to see how our use of “causation” in
everyday speech could help us to understand the causal interac-
tions in the brain’s neural networks and the relationship between
consciousness and the physical world. Furthermore, some of
the problems with the measurement of consciousness are linked
to the causal closure of the physical world. This can be pre-
cisely defined using an empirical account of causation, but it
is less clear how this can be done with a conceptual account.
Other advantages of empirical theories include their ability to
precisely identify causal events, to exclude cases of apparent
causation between correlated events, and to easily relate the
metaphorical and I am not taking sides on the debate about the relationship
between consciousness and representations.
15This is similar to Fell et al’s. (2004) distinction between efficient and
explanatory causation. Efficient causation is concerned with the physical
relation of two events and the exchange of physically conserved quantities.
Explanatory causation refers to the law like character of conjoined events.
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 714 | 6
Gamez The measurement of consciousness
causal laws governing macro scale objects, such as cars and trees,
to the micro scale interactions between molecules, atoms and
quarks.
A detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
different theories of empirical causation is beyond the scope of
this paper, but it will be easier to analyze the c-reporting of con-
sciousness with a concrete theory in mind. For this purpose I will
use Dowe’s theory of empirical causation, which is the most fully
developed conserved quantities approach and has the following
key features:
• A conserved quantity is a quantity governed by a conservation
law, such as mass-energy, momentum or charge.
• A causal process is a world line of an object that possesses a
conserved quantity.
• A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines that
involves the exchange of a conserved quantity.
This account of causation will be referred to as e-causation. The
framework developed in this paper relies on there being some
workable theory of empirical causation, but it does not depend on
the details of any particular account—if Dowe’s theory is found
to be problematic, an improved version can be substituted in
its place. If all empirical approaches to causation turn out to be
unworkable, then we might have to limit causal concepts to ordi-
nary language and abandon the attempt to develop a scientific
understanding of the causal relationship between consciousness
and the physical world.
To better understand how e-causation can explain causal rela-
tionships at different levels of description of a system, consider
the example of a car moving along a road at 5m/s that collides
with a tree and knocks it over (Figure 2A). This is a clear exam-
ple of an e-causal interaction between large scale objects in which
physically conserved quantities are exchanged between the car
and tree. This macro-scale e-causal interaction can be reduced
down to the micro-scale e-causal interactions between the physi-
cal constituents of the car and tree (Figure 2B), and an empirical
approach to causation also enables us to distinguish between true
and false causes of a particular event. For example, the car’s engine
temperature is a macro-scale property of the physical world that
moves along at the same speed as the car and collides with the tree
(Figure 2C). However, the macro property of engine temperature
does not exchange physically conserved quantities with the tree
(ignoring any minor transfer of heat), and so the engine tempera-
ture does not e-cause the tree to fall down, although it can e-cause
other macro-scale events, such as the melting of ice. Similar e-
causal accounts can be given of the laws of other macro-scale
sciences, such as geology, chemistry, and biology16.
In physics it is generally assumed that the amount of energy-
momentum in the physical universe is constant as long as the
reference frame of the observer remains unchanged—when part
of the physical world gains energy-momentum, this energy-
momentum must have come from elsewhere in the physical
16Kim (1998) gives a detailed discussion of the relationship between macro
and micro physical laws.
FIGURE 2 | The relationship between macro- and micro-scale e-causal
events. (A) A car moving at 5m/s collides with a tree and the tree falls over.
This is a macro-scale e-causal event in which the car passes
energy-momentum to the tree. (B) The macro-scale e-causal interaction
between the car and tree can be reduced to the micro-scale exchanges of
energy-momentum between atoms in the car and tree. (C) The temperature
of the car’s engine is a macro-scale property that moves at 5m/s and collides
with the tree. The engine temperature exchanges a small amount of
energy-momentum with the tree in the form of heat, but not enough to
e-cause the tree to fall down.
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universe. It is also generally assumed that the net quantity of elec-
tric charge in the universe is conserved, so if part of the physical
world gains electric charge, another part of the physical world
must have lost charge or there must have been an interaction in
which equal quantities of positive and negative charge were cre-
ated or destroyed. Similar arguments apply to other physically
conserved quantities, which leads to the following assumption:
A5. The physical world is e-causally closed.
According to A5, any change in a physical system’s conserved
quantities can in principle be traced back to a set of physi-
cal e-causes that led the system to gain or lose those conserved
quantities at that time17.
E-CAUSATION AND REPORTS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS
C-reports about consciousness are changes in the physical world
(vibrations in the air, marks on paper, button presses, movements
of limbs, etc.) that enable people to gain information about each
other’s conscious states. In everyday language we speak about a
person reporting their consciousness, describing their conscious-
ness, and so on. This might naively be interpreted as the idea that
consciousness directly or indirectly alters the activity in the brain
areas controlling speech, producing vibrations in the larynx that
lead to sound vibrations in the air (see Figure 3).
17Kimmakes a similar point about the causal closure of the physical world: “If
you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that
will never take you outside the physical domain” (Kim, 1998; Kim, p. 40).
The problem with this naive picture is that consciousness
could only e-cause a chain of events leading to a verbal report
if it could pass a physically conserved quantity, such as energy-
momentum or charge, to neurons in the reporting chain—for
example, if it could push them over their threshold and cause
them to fire18. If the physical world is e-causally closed (A5),
then a conserved quantity can only be passed from conscious-
ness to an area of the brain if consciousness is a physical phe-
nomena, i.e., if consciousness is the correlates of consciousness
(C1 in Figure 3)19.
While it is possible that some version of identity theory or
physicalism is correct, it would be controversial to base the sci-
entific study of consciousness on this assumption, which would
undermine our ability to gather data about the correlates of con-
sciousness in a theory-neutral way. It would be much better if we
could find a way of interpreting the measurement of conscious-
ness that does not depend on the assumption that physicalism or
functionalism are true.
In this paper it has been assumed that consciousness is func-
tionally connected to the correlates of consciousness (L1), shown
as C1 in Figure 3, and that c-reports contain information about
all of the consciousness that is present. The only thing we need
to fully account for the measurement of consciousness is a con-
nection between C1 and the c-reports. This can be solved by
18Wilson (1999) discusses the minimum amount of physical effect that would
be required for consciousness to influence the physical world. Burns (1999)
gives a similar discussion in relation to the problem of free will.
19A related point is made by Fell et al. (2004), who argue that the neural
correlates of consciousness cannot e-cause conscious states.
FIGURE 3 | Naive picture of how consciousness leads to a c-report about
consciousness. The labels S1, C1, R1, etc. refer to any kind of spatiotemporal
structure in the brain, such as the activation of a brain area, neural
synchronization, electromagnetic waves, quantum events, and so on. Their
names and locations are only illustrative and not intended to correspond to
particular anatomical paths or structures. An e-causal chain of sensory
spatiotemporal structures, S1–S3, leads to the appearance of a spatiotemporal
structure, C1, that is correlated with consciousness. In this example, the
content of consciousness is determined by the sensory events, but in principle
it could be independent of S1–S3, for example if the subject was dreaming.
The conscious state is the beginning of an e-causal chain of spatiotemporal
structures, R1–R3, that result in a verbal description of the consciousness.
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introducing a further assumption that fits naturally within the
current framework:
A6. The correlates of consciousness e-cause a platinum stan-
dard system’s c-reports about consciousness.
This states that the correlates of consciousness are the first stage
in a complex chain of e-causation that leads to c-reports about
consciousness. Since it can be difficult to measure e-causation,
in some circumstances A6 can be substituted for the weaker
assumption:
A6a. The correlates of consciousness are effectively connected
to a platinum standard system’s c-reports about consciousness.
Effective connectivity can be measured using algorithms, such as
transfer entropy (Schreiber, 2000) or Granger causality (Granger,
1969)20, which work on the assumption that a cause precedes
and increases the predictability of the effect. However, this does
not always coincide with e-causation—for example when an
unknown third source is connected to two areas with different
delays. By themselves A6 and A6a do not say anything about
the strength of the relationship between the correlates of con-
sciousness and the c-reports about consciousness—for example,
there could be a very weak e-causal chain leading from the corre-
lates of consciousness to the c-reports, which could be primarily
driven by unconscious brain areas. Assumptions A6 and A6a are
illustrated in Figure 4.
We now have everything that we need for the measurement
of consciousness during an experiment on the correlates of con-
sciousness. During an experiment there is a functional connection
between consciousness and C1. All of the consciousness is avail-
able for report (A4) and c-reporting does not break the causal
closure of the physical world (A5) because the c-reports about
consciousness are e-caused by C1 (A6).
TWO TYPES OF CORRELATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
It is hoped that experimental work will eventually identify a min-
imal set of spatiotemporal structures that are correlates of con-
sciousness according to definition D1, because they are present
when a particular conscious experience, e1, is present and absent
as a collection when e1 is absent. According to assumption A6,
these correlates should e-cause c-reports during experiments on
the correlates of consciousness. However, it is possible that there
are spatiotemporal structures in the brain that are correlates of
consciousness according to D1, but cannot e-cause c-reports. This
suggests that proposed correlates of consciousness can be divided
into two types:
Type A. A spatiotemporal structure that matches definition
D1 and can e-cause c-reports about consciousness. Type A
correlates are plausible candidates for metaphysical theories
of consciousness, such as physicalism, because the correlate
actually e-causes the c-report.
20Chicharro and Ledberg (2012) discuss the extent to which Pearl’s (2000)
interventionist theory of causality could be used to measure causal relation-
ships in the brain.
Type B. A measurement of the physical system that is corre-
lated with consciousness, but there is no plausible mechanism
by which this correlate could e-cause c-reports about con-
sciousness. This type of correlate might be an accurate predic-
tor of consciousness, but consciousness cannot be claimed to
be identical with this type of correlate because this would break
the link between consciousness and c-reports. Type B corre-
lates can be interpreted as indirect methods for identifying the
presence of type A correlates.
Whether a correlate of consciousness is type A or B hinges on
whether the correlate and its microphysical reduction [see sec-
tion Empirical Causation (e-causation)] can be interpreted as
e-causing c-reports about consciousness.
A clear example of a type A correlate is a functional corre-
late of consciousness, such as a global workspace, implemented
in spiking neurons21. The macro-scale function can be reduced
down to activity patterns in spiking neurons, which pass phys-
ically conserved quantities to other spiking neurons and can
e-cause c-reports about consciousness. A clear example of a type
B correlate would be a fMRI pattern that was correlated with con-
sciousness. fMRI measures changes in blood flow in the brain,
which can be used to infer the relative levels of neuron activity.
While oxygen could be said to indirectly e-cause a neuron to fire,
the fMRI measurement peaks several seconds after neurons have
fired—indicating an influx of blood to replace oxygen depleted
by recent activity. Since the fMRI signal can occur after a report
about consciousness has been made, it cannot be an e-cause of
c-reports.
More ambiguous examples of type B correlates are measures
of causation, such as causal density (Seth et al., 2006) and liveli-
ness (Gamez and Aleksander, 2011), which plausibly correspond
to the rate of exchange of physically conserved quantities within a
particular area. However, the amount of causal interaction within
an area is dissociable from its causal interactions with other areas,
which suggests that causal density and liveliness are not likely to
be capable of e-causing c-reports. Similar issues apply to the infor-
mation integration theory of consciousness (Tononi, 2008), since
is not clear how a high level of information integration within a
particular brain area could e-cause c-reports.
SEPARATING OUT THE CORRELATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
This section briefly explores how the framework presented in
this paper relates to experimental work on the neural corre-
lates of consciousness. This has to distinguish the correlates of
consciousness, from sensory and reporting structures that carry
information to and from the correlates. The correlates also have
to be separated from prerequisites and consequences that typically
co-occur with consciousness. All of the labels for spatiotemporal
structures in the brain (C1, S1–S3, R1–R3, etc.) are taken from
Figure 422.
21See Gamez et al. (2013) and Zylberberg et al. (2010) for examples of such
models.
22There is not space in this paper to provide a full summary of experiments on
the neural correlates of consciousness. More detailed reviews are given by Rees
et al. (2002); Tononi and Koch (2008), and Dehaene and Changeux (2011).
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FIGURE 4 | The relationship between consciousness and c-reports about
consciousness. The labels S1, C1, R1 etc. refer to spatiotemporal structures
in the brain, such as the activation of a brain area, neural synchronization,
electromagnetic waves, quantum events, and so on. Their names and
locations are only illustrative and not intended to correspond to particular
anatomical paths or structures. S1–S3 are unconscious spatiotemporal
structures that pass information to C1, such as the early visual stages leading
up to and possibly including V1. The correlates of consciousness, C1, is a
spatiotemporal structure in the brain that is assumed to be functionally
connected to conscious states (L1). This could include sensory areas, such as
MT/V5. C1 is assumed to be the first stage in an e-causal chain of
spatiotemporal structures, R1–R3, that lead to a report about consciousness.
B1–B3 and N1–N3 are spatiotemporal structures that are directly or indirectly
connected to C1, but do not e-cause c-reports about consciousness.
S1–S3 are unconscious sensory processing stages, such as activ-
ity in the visual system up to and possibly including V1. Later
sensory processing stages, such asMT/V5, are likely to be included
in the correlates of consciousness, C1. A common technique for
separating S1–S3 from C1 is to present a constant stimulus to the
subject that leads them to have alternating conscious experiences,
which they report using a button press or similar behavior. The
spatiotemporal structures in the brain that that covary with the
reported consciousness are assumed to be part of C1, whereas
spatiotemporal structures that remain tied to the sensory stim-
ulus are assumed to be part of S1–S3 (de Graaf et al., 2012).
Binocular rivalry experiments are typical examples of this type
of work (Blake, 2001) and it can also be carried out using bistable
images, such as a Necker cube. A second way of distinguishing S1–
S3 from C1 is to measure the brain when the subject is perceiving
an object and contrast this with the state of the brain when the
subject is imagining or remembering the same object. The spa-
tiotemporal structures that are common to the two situations are
likely to be part of C1. A third approach is to use lesioning or
TMS to selectively disable S1–S3 to establish whether they are
correlated with conscious states. A fourth method is to present
masked stimuli to the subject to identify the parts of the brain
that process information unconsciously (Dehaene et al., 2001),
and a fifth technique is to use the type of information that is pro-
cessed in a particular brain area to determine whether it is part of
C1. For example, Lamme (2010) suggests that the features of con-
sciously perceived objects, such as color, shape, and motion, are
bound together, whereas this type of binding is not present in the
early visual system. The brain also contains a substantial amount
of information that cannot be consciously accessed, such as the
body-centric information used for motor control (Goodale and
Milner, 1992). The spatiotemporal structures processing this type
of information are unlikely to be part of C1.
Distinguishing C1 from R1–R3 is potentially problematic
because information in C1 will appear in different forms along
the e-causal chain from C1 to R3, and so measurements of any of
these spatiotemporal structures could potentially be used to make
predictions about consciousness. Another potential difficulty is
that the communication mechanisms that facilitate c-reporting
could be confused with the correlates of consciousness because
they are present when consciousness is present and potentially
absent when consciousness is absent. For example, neural syn-
chronization might be an essential mechanism for any kind of
reporting (communication through coherence) and have noth-
ing to do with consciousness23. Some progress could be made by
measuring the brain while the subject uses different methods to
make the same c-report about consciousness. For example, they
could verbally describe their consciousness, describe it using sign
language, write down a description, describe it after short and
long delays, and so on. Each of these c-reporting methods will
involve different spatiotemporal structures in the brain, whereas
the correlates of consciousness should be similar in each case. A
second approach would be to accurately measure the timing of
different events in the brain. It is expected that the correlates of
consciousness should occur after the sensory chain S1–S3 and
before R1–R3. A third method would be to use a backtracing
procedure (Krichmar et al., 2005) that starts at the motor output
stage and works back through the brain to locate the start of the
23Other issues related to the separation of consciousness from reporting
mechanisms are discussed by Block (2007).
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reporting e-causal chain R1–R3. This should be halted just before
it enters the unconscious sensory processing stages S1–S3.
B1–B3 roughly correspond to what de Graaf et al. (2012)
and Aru et al. (2012) describe as the prerequisites and conse-
quences of consciousness, although late stage sensory and early
stage reporting could also be included in this category. B1 could
be a mechanism that is necessary for the correlates of conscious-
ness to occur, but is not actually correlated with consciousness.
For example, a background level of activity, possibly provided
by the reticular activating system, might be needed to bring the
neurons in C1 closer to threshold so that the correlates of con-
sciousness can take place, and it has been suggested that attention
might be necessary for consciousness, but not directly correlated
with it (de Graaf et al., 2012). In some cases B1 could be separated
out by disabling it and C1 facilitated with a different method—
for example, the reticular activating system could be disabled and
a chemical added to C1 to bring the neurons closer to threshold.
Some of the methods for dissociating S1–S3 from C1 could also
be used to separate C1 from B1—for example, B1 might contain
information that cannot be consciously accessed, which would
suggest that it is not directly correlated with consciousness.
B2 is a spatiotemporal structure that is a consequence of C1,
but which is not directly associated with consciousness and does
not lead to a c-report. For example, a conscious image might
activate unconscious representations or B2 could be an event
related to memory consolidation (Aru et al., 2012). This type
of spatiotemporal structure is relatively straightforward to dis-
tinguish from C1 because disabling it (lesion or TMS) should
not affect consciousness or c-reports. The recurrent connection
between C1 and B3 will make B3 difficult to separate out and it
could easily be mis-identified as the source of the c-reports. If
B3 is a prerequisite of C1, then a similar approach to B1 could
be pursued, or B3 could be dissociated from C1 if it contained
unconscious information. Other strategies for separating B1–B3
from C1 are discussed by de Graaf et al. (2012) and Aru et al.
(2012).
N1–N3 are spatiotemporal structures that are generated in the
course of c-reporting, but are not e-causes of the c-report. They
need to be considered because backtracing methods could mis-
takenly identify N1 and N2 as e-causes of the c-report, and C1
might be effectively connected to N1 and N3. The use of differ-
ent c-reporting mechanisms is likely to produce some progress
with the dissociation of N1–N3 from C1, and many of the meth-
ods that have been suggested for S1–S3, R1–R3, and B1–B3 are
applicable to N1–N3.
Depending on what C1 turns out to be there are likely to
be multiple interpretations of what the actual correlates of con-
sciousness are. For example, if C1 turned out to be a global
workspace implemented in neurons synchronized at 40Hz, then
is the correlate some biological feature of the neurons, the func-
tion, the electromagnetic waves generated by the synchronization,
or all of these together? A more detailed discussion of how
different candidate correlates can and cannot be separated out is
given by Gamez (2012).
In practice, the large amount of feedback between brain areas
is likely to make the separation of the different spatiotemporal
structures illustrated in Figure 4 extremely difficult. The different
time scales on which different types of information are processed
will complicate the picture, and the spatial and temporal resolu-
tion of our current measuring procedures are completely inad-
equate for the task. In the future optogenetic techniques might
help to address some of these problems, and many of the difficul-
ties can be understood by building models of proposed correlates
of consciousness and examining how they can be distinguished
from other spatiotemporal structures in the brain.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has put forward a set of assumptions that could
account for our ability to measure consciousness through c-
reports. This framework starts with the idea that c-reports about
consciousness from platinum standard systems are functionally
connected to the platinum standard systems’ consciousness. This
enables consciousness to be measured during experiments on the
correlates of consciousness. Further assumptions were introduced
to explain how consciousness could be connected to c-reports
without breaking the causal closure of the physical world.
A person who accepts this framework can set aside philosoph-
ical debates about color inversion and zombies and focus on the
empirical work of identifying correlations between consciousness
and the physical world. Their measurement of consciousness will
not be contingent on an acceptance of functionalism or physical-
ism, and it will not depend on an e-causal relationship between
consciousness and the physical world. This framework prevents
scientific results about consciousness from being undermined by
philosophical problems: a scientist who rejects it will have to
account for the measurement of consciousness in some other way.
While this framework has many benefits for scientific work on
consciousness, it also imposes constraints. Results about the cor-
relates of consciousness can only be considered to be true given
these assumptions. Although this framework is compatible with
most of the traditional metaphysical approaches to consciousness
(for example, physicalism, dualism, and epiphenomenalism), it is
not compatible with panpsychism and type B theories about the
correlates of consciousness. Scientists who accept this framework
will have to avoid panpsychist theories, and they should ensure
that proposed correlates of consciousness are capable of e-causing
c-reports during experiments on the correlates of consciousness.
Information integration theories of consciousness are particularly
problematic when considered in the light of these requirements
since they propose that all information integration is associated
with some level of consciousness, and it is not clear how infor-
mation patterns could e-cause c-reports. The plausibility of other
scientific theories of consciousness should be judged relative to
these constraints.
This paper has assumed that consciousness is always poten-
tially accessible during experiments on the correlates of con-
sciousness (A4). Once the correlates of consciousness have been
identified they could be used make predictions about inaccessible
consciousness in non-experimental situations. An example of this
type of reasoning can be found in Lamme (2006, 2010), who uses
paradigmatic cases of reportable consciousness to establish the
link between consciousness and recurrent processing, and then
makes inferences about the presence of inaccessible phenomenal
consciousness. Knowledge about the correlates of consciousness
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could also be used to make predictions about consciousness in
systems that are not platinum standards, such as brain-damaged
patients, infants, animals, and artificial systems.
Controversial experiments by Libet (1985) have indicated that
our awareness of our decision to act comes after the motor prepa-
rations for the act (the readiness potential). This suggests that our
conscious will might not be the cause of our actions, and Wegner
(2002) has argued that we make inferences after the fact about
whether we caused a particular action. These results could be
interpreted to show that the correlates of consciousness do not e-
cause c-reports about consciousness because motor preparations
for verbal output (for example) would precede the events that are
correlated with consciousness. This problem could be resolved
by measuring the relative timing of a proposed correlate of con-
sciousness (C1) and the sequence of events leading to the report
about consciousness, including the readiness potential (R1–R3).
If the framework presented in this paper is correct, then it should
be possible to find correlates of consciousness that have the appro-
priate timing relationship; if no suitable correlates can be found,
then the framework presented in this paper should be rejected as
flawed24.
The basic illustration in Figure 4 shows incoming sensory data
being transformed into a correlate of consciousness that e-causes
c-reports. This would be questioned by people who see the brain
as dynamically engaged with the world and are skeptical about
internal representations—for example, O’Regan and Noë (2001)
and Noë (2009). Sensorimotor theorists have also claimed that
there is an identity between our sensorimotor engagement with
the world and consciousness, which would make it necessary to
include the body and environment in C1 and lead to a modifi-
cation of assumption A1. Whatever the nature of C1 turns out
to be, the e-causal relationship between C1 and R1–R3 has to
be retained by any theory of consciousness that claims to explain
howwe can empirically study correlations betweenmeasurements
of consciousness and the physical world.
It is reasonably easy to see how the contents of conscious-
ness that are c-reported could be e-caused by physical events. For
example, we can tell a simple story about how light of a particular
frequency could lead to the activation of spatiotemporal struc-
tures in the brain, and how learning processes could associate
these with sounds, such as “red” or “rojo.” This might eventu-
ally enable a trained brain to produce the sounds “I can see a
red hat” or “I am aware of a red hat” when it is presented with
a pattern of electromagnetic waves. Since consciousness does not
appear to us as a particular thing or property in our environment
and many languages do not contain the word “consciousness”
(Wilkes, 1988), it is not necessary to identify sensory stimuli that
the physical brain could learn to associate with the sound “con-
sciousness.” The concept of consciousness can be more plausibly
interpreted as an abstract concept that is acquired by subjects in
24It is worth noting that Libet’s measurement of the timing of conscious
events implicitly depends on a functional connection between consciousness
and c-reporting behavior—the relative timing of consciousness and action can
only bemeasured if consciousness is functionally connected to c-reports about
consciousness.
different ways, and it is conceivable that the science of conscious-
ness could be carried out without subjects ever using the word
“consciousness” in their c-reports.
Like Chalmers’ (1998) pre-experimental bridging principles,
many of the assumptions set out in this paper cannot be experi-
mentally tested because they are a condition of possibility of any
kind of empirical work on consciousness. They can be seen as
a preliminary attempt to shift the study of consciousness from
a pre-paradigmatic state (Metzinger, 2003) to a paradigmatic
science—an attempt to articulate the paradigm that will gov-
ern our normal scientific work on consciousness (Kuhn, 1970).
Although many parts of this framework cannot be tested, its self-
consistency can be improved as well as the way in which it relates
to general principles in the philosophy of science and the study of
consciousness. A science of consciousness based on it might also
reach the point at which it no longer coherently hangs together,
whichmight force us to abandon the scientific study of conscious-
ness altogether or to formulate a completely new set of framing
principles.
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APPENDIX
DEFINITIONS
D1. A platinum standard system is a physical system that is
assumed to be associated with consciousness some or all of the
time.
D2. A correlate of a conscious experience, e1, is a minimal
set of one or more spatiotemporal structures in the physical
world. This set is present when e1 is present and absent when
e1 is absent.
ASSUMPTIONS
A1. The normally functioning adult human brain is a platinum
standard system.
A2. The consciousness associated with a platinum standard
system nomologically supervenes on the platinum standard
system. In our current universe physically identical platinum
standard systems are associated with identical consciousness.
A2a. The consciousness associated with a platinum stan-
dard system nomologically supervenes on the correlates of
consciousness in the platinum standard system. In our current
universe the spatiotemporal structures that correlate with con-
scious experience e1 will be associated with e1wherever they are
found.
A3. During an experiment on the correlates of consciousness,
the consciousness associated with a platinum standard system
is functionally connected to its c-reports about consciousness.
A4. During an experiment on the correlates of consciousness
all conscious states associated with a platinum standard system
are available for c-reports about consciousness.
A5. The physical world is e-causally closed.
A6. The correlates of consciousness e-cause a platinum stan-
dard system’s c-reports about consciousness.
A6a. The correlates of consciousness are effectively connected
to a platinum standard system’s c-reports about consciousness.
LEMMAS
L1. There is a functional connection between consciousness
and the correlates of consciousness.
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